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Since this article was originally written and presented in the spring of
1992, considerable progress has been made in the effort to achieve an
internationalconvention regulatingjurisdiction and recognition of foreign
judgments. In May 1993, the Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw decided "to include in the agenda for
work of the Conference the question of the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters" and requested the
Conference's Secretary General to convene a Special Commission to
"study[] further the problems involved in drafting a new convention, " to
"make[] proposals with respect to work which might be undertaken," and
to "suggest[] the timing of such work. "'
The Special Commission met in the Hague on June 20-24, 1994, to
begin this preliminary work on a convention. Our hope is that the
Conference's Eighteenth Session in 1996 will make a convention on
jurisdiction and recognition an agenda item for an extraordinarysession
of the Conference in 1997 or 1998.
The article was revised in May 1994 to take into account these and
other developments since the spring of 1992. Its intention remains the
same, however: to discuss the genesis of what is now the Hague jurisdiction and recognitionproject, to considerthe merits and demerits of various
approachesto jurisdiction and recognitionproblems, and to explain why,
in the United States's view, the most promising institutional basis for
achieving a satisfactory convention was the Hague Conference on Private
InternationalLaw.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. delegation to the June 1992 Meeting of the Special Commission on
General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law proposed that the Conference undertake work on a convention dealing
with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The proposal was
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received with interest. After considerable discussion, the Special Commission
decided that the matter should be considered by a small Working Group. The
Working Group, which was composed of experts from nine countries, met in the
Hague on October 29, 1992,2 and discussed the following questions: Is the
proposed topic an appropriate one for the Conference to take up? If so, what
are the advantages of an approach in the form of a convention dealing only with
recognition and enforcement (a convention simple3 ), as compared with a
convention that addresses not only recognition and enforcement but also the
assumption of jurisdiction to adjudicate (a convention double)? Or would-as
the United States proposed to the Special Commission-a mixed form (a
convention mixte), incorporating elements of both a convention simple and a
convention double be preferable?
The Working Group's charge was to assist the Seventeenth Session of the
Conference, held in May 1993, in reaching a decision as to whether the
subject-in what form and with what priority-would be placed on the
Conference's agenda of future work. The Working Group's conclusions, as
drawn up by the Conference's Permanent Bureau,4 indicated "unanimous[]
agree[ment] on the desirability of attempting to negotiate through the Hague
Conference a new general convention on jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement of judgments., 5 The Working Group expressed a preference for
the convention mixte approach,6 and agreed "that negotiating [such] a
convention ...
, although not an easy matter, seemed to be technically
feasible."7
In order to assist the Working Group in its deliberations, the United States
prepared a paper discussing the topic in general as well as the U.S. proposal for
a mixed convention; to this paper was appended a draft skeleton convention
illustrating the general form that a mixed convention might take. To avoid the
possibility of prejudicing decisions that were for the Conference to make, the
draft did not go into details, even for illustrative purposes, on such issues as
what grounds for jurisdiction should be included in the convention's approved
list.
The U.S. State Department's decision, in the Spring of 1992, to encourage
new work by the Hague Conference on recognition and enforcement of
judgments was made after the possibility of direct negotiations on this subject
between the United States and the European Community-European Free Trade

2. The countries represented were Argentina, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Hungary, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. The experts from the United States were Peter D.
Trooboff, Peter H. Pfund, and Arthur T. von Mehren.
3. This expression can be translated into English as a "simple" or a "single" convention. The
latter formulation is used by the Conference's Permanent Bureau. As neither formulation is current
in English, the French expression is used in this article.
4. PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: GENERAL

AFFAIRS (Preliminary Doc. No. 19, Aug. 1992) (for the attention of the Seventeenth Session).
5. Id. at 17.
6. Id. at 3-7.
7. Id. at 17.
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Area ("EC-EFTA") countries had been explored. Recourse to the Conference
seemed more attractive to the State Department than negotiations with the ECEFTA group on three scores: First, the Conference's Secretariat was interested
in the topic; second, the Conference provides excellent preparatory and
logistical support; and, third, perhaps most importantly, in Conference
negotiations the United States would not face alone a group of European
countries which-through the Brussels and Lugano Conventions-have
committed themselves to positions respecting assumption of jurisdiction and
enforcement of judgments that, although appropriate between and among
nations integrating various sectors of their economies and societies, may not be
appropriate for countries that are less closely linked economically, geographically, and politically.
Part II of this article addresses previous U.S. and European experiences
respecting treaty regulation of the recognition and enforcement problem. Part
III discusses the rationales for U.S. negotiation of a judgments treaty and the
mechanisms through which such a treaty could be negotiated. Finally, Part IV
outlines the advantages and disadvantages of conventions simples, doubles, and
mixtes.
II

A

A.

GLANCE AT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

U.S. Experience with Recognition and Enforcement Treaties

Traditionally, the United States has relied on judicially developed rules in
according recognition and enforcement to foreign judgments. In contrast to
Europe and, to a lesser extent, Latin America, the United States has rarely used
its treaty-making power to handle recognition and enforcement problems.'
Explanations for this include the federal nature of the U.S. legal order and the
traditional sensibilities of the states regarding local control of the administration
of justice.
After the Second World War, however, a notable change took place in the
U.S. political climate with respect to federal control over such matters as the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. On October 15, 1964, the
United States became a member of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law. A number of important conventions adopted by the
Conference have since been ratified by the United States. In 1970, the United
States took another important, and for it unprecedented, step of ratifying a
major multilateral international recognition convention, the 1958 United Nations

8. The U.S. Department of State had declined as early as 1874 to use the treaty-making power in
the area of private international law and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. See David
Luther Woodward, ReciprocalRecognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in the United States, the
United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, 8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 299, 310
(1983).
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Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.9
A few years later, the United States and the United Kingdom entered into
bilateral negotiations for a Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters. An ad referendum text was
initialed in 1976,1° and further negotiations in 1978 resulted in agreement ad
referendum on modifications to the 1976 draft.'
Negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom had sought
to take into account U.K. concerns about U.S. practices respecting such matters
as punitive and multiple damages, and, more generally, the perception that
damage awards given in the United States were, on occasion, considerably
higher than damage awards given in the United Kingdom in generally
comparable situations. Accordingly, the Convention was not to apply to
judgments "to the extent they are for punitive or multiple damages."' 2 The
1978 negotiations added a new Article 8A, which provided that
[wlhere the respondent establishes that the amount awarded by the court of origin is
greatly in excess of the amount, including costs, that would have been awarded on the
basis of the findings of law and fact established in the court of origin, had the
assessment of that amount been a matter for the court addressed that court may, to
the extent then permitted by the law generally applicable in that court to the
recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments, recognize and enforce the judgment
3
in a lesser amount.

In 1980, despite U.S. efforts to allay U.K. concerns, the negotiations broke
down, due in large measure to the concerns respecting product liability held by
U.K. manufacturers and the U.K. insurance industry; in a sense, they preferred
the devil they knew to the one they did not. 4
B.

European Experience with Recognition and Enforcement Treaties

Unlike the United States, European and Latin American countries have for
decades looked to international conventions as an important source of the law
on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 5 By the 1930s, not
only civil law jurisdictions such as France but also a common law jurisdiction,
the United Kingdom, had concluded numerous bilateral treaties regulating

9. June 20, 1958, 23 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force with respect to the United
States, Dec. 29, 1970).
10. Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters,
initialed Oct. 26, 1976, U.S.-U.K., 16 I.L.M. 71 [hereinafter Reciprocal Recognition Convention]. The
author of the present article and the late Ambassador Richard D. Kearney were the principal U.S.
negotiators.
11. For a convenient look at the differences between the 1976 and 1978 texts, see Woodward, supra
note 8, at 322-34.
12. Reciprocal Recognition Convention, supra note 10, art. 2(2)(b), 16 I.L.M. at 73.
13. Woodward, supra note 8, at 327.
14. See Peter M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219, 223, 238 (1979); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of SisterState Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic
Community and the United States, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1044, 1060 n.61 (1981).
15. Georges Droz, Regards sur le droit international privg compar6, 229 RECUEIL DES COURS
D'ACADIMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9, 100-09 (1991).
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recognition and enforcement practices. For the most part,16 multilateral
conventions first became important for the recognition and enforcement
problem after the Second World War. In 1971, the Hague Conference on
Private International Law completed work on a Convention on the Recognition17
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.
The Convention combines bilateral and multilateral elements; it was negotiated
multilaterally, but was to come into force bilaterally. The Convention's failure

to gain acceptance is likely attributable to the completion in 1968 of the
European Economic Community Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.t" The Brussels convention
naturally commanded the allegiance of the then-six Community states, which
had prepared it in the belief that the ideal of the European Community would
be furthered by facilitating the enforcement of judgments among its members.
As the Community grew in size and importance, the territorial scope and
legal significance of the Brussels Convention increased.1 9 By the 1980s,
economic and legal integration within the European Community had progressed

to the point that several European countries that were not members became
interested in concluding a recognition and enforcement convention with the
member states as a group. Although in many cases bilateral treaties already
existed between these states and EC members,2" it was thought that a generally
accepted European regime for recognition and enforcement purposes would

create a "European judicial area," thus simplifying and expediting the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
On September 16,1988, the member states of the European Community and
the European Free Trade Association concluded a Jurisdiction and Enforcement

16. A few, quite general provisions respecting recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
are contained in Latin American multilateral conventions negotiated between 1889 and 1940. 2 UNITED
NATIONS,

REGISTER

OF TEXTS

OF CONVENTIONS

AND

OTHER

INSTRUMENTS

CONCERNING

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5-7, 21-23, 18-20 (1973) (containing the English translations of the relevant

provisions of the following conventions: The Treaty Concerning the Union of South American States
in Respect of Procedural Law (1889 Montevideo Treaty; six states are parties); the Treaty on
International Procedural Law (1940 Montevideo Treaty; three states are parties); and the Convention
on Private International Law (1928 Bustamente Code; fifteen states are parties)).
17. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter Hague Recognition Convention].
Having been signed by Cyprus, The Netherlands, and Portugal, the Convention has technically entered
into force. However, it is not in effect because the aforesaid states have not concluded the required
bilateral agreements, nor are they likely to do so.
18. Convention Concerning Judicial Competence and the Execution of Decisions in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1262 U.N.T.S. 153 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. Negotiations
for the Convention began in 1959. The Convention entered into force in 1973 for the original
contracting States (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands).
19. The original text has been amended three times: first, by the Convention of October 9, 1978,
on the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom; second, by the Convention of October
25, 1982, on the accession of Greece; and third by the Convention of May 26, 1989, on the accession
of Spain and Portugal.
20. For a list of bilateral treaties, see Article 55 of Convention of Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano
Convention] (entered into force Jan. 1, 1992).
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convention in Lugano,2 which accepts the general approach of the Brussels
Convention. The Lugano Convention does not, of course, displace the Brussels
Convention with regard to relations inter se of the EC member states. The
Lugano Convention applies rather to relations between EC and EFTA
countries, and among EFTA countries. Recognition and enforcement problems
arising among a large number of European states are now regulated by the
essentially parallel provisions of either the Brussels or Lugano Conventions.
Comparable language in the two Conventions may, however, on occasion not
be uniformly interpreted and applied; for purposes of the Lugano Convention,
national courts outside the EC are not bound to accept the interpretations given
by the Court of Justice of the EC to parallel provisions in the Brussels
Convention.
These developments have created a basically uniform European regime for
the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in Europe. Resting on
international agreements, the system is, by its nature, reciprocal. Negotiation
of such a regime would not have been possible if each state had acted
separately. Multilateral negotiations preceding the Brussels Convention
occurred within a legal and political context such that the participating states
ultimately had little choice but to accept the result. Thereafter, as the EC
expanded, new member states were in the same position, although minor
alterations to cure special problems resulting from the particularities of the new
EC members states' laws were possible.
The position of the EFTA member states was similar. If they wanted a
judgments convention with the EC member states, they had to accept the
provisions of the Brussels Convention. The EC was not under pressure to agree
to a substantively different treaty regime covering EFTA judgments. Had the
Brussels Convention not been acceptable to the EFTA member states, the status
quo would have continued.
III
PROSPECTS FOR U.S. NEGOTIATION OF A JUDGMENTS CONVENTION

This brief history suggests both that the United States may be interested in
entering into treaty arrangements concerning the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments,' and that the obstacles that must be overcome in
Against these background
negotiating such treaties are considerable.
advantages would result
what
First,
discussed.
are
three
topics
propositions,
from using treaties to regulate a substantial segment of the recognition and
enforcement practice involving the United States? Second, are there any
21. Id.
22. A further motive for U.S. interest in treaty regulation of these matters is to remove
discriminatory practices respecting the assumption of jurisdiction that were provided for by the Brussels
Convention for suits brought against a defendant not domiciled in a contracting state, see von Mehren,
supra note 14, at 1058-60, and are now a feature of the Lugano Convention as well. The relevant
provisions of the Lugano Convention are discussed infra text accompanying notes 39-40; see also infra
note 25 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms through which such treaties could be negotiated on a multilateral
basis, or is bilateral negotiation alone feasible? Third, what is the likelihood
that bilateral negotiations or, if feasible, multilateral negotiations could be
brought to successful conclusions?
To assess the advantages of regulating by treaty a substantial segment of the
recognition and enforcement practice involving the United States, one needs a
basic understanding of the current situation. The position of the holder of a
foreign judgment who wishes to enforce it in the United States is first
considered. Where foreign judgments are at issue, each state remains, barring
federal preemption, free to apply its own law respecting recognition and
enforcement. Unlike sister-state judgments, foreign judgments are not covered
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution of the United States.'
An element of federal oversight exists, however, under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 Recognition and enforcement will be denied
on due process grounds to foreign judgments that rest on unreasonable
jurisdictional bases or that resulted from egregiously defective procedures.'
States are largely free to decide for themselves the effects that are to be
accorded foreign adjudications. Subject only to due process, each state
determines what jurisdictional test, if any, such a judgment must satisfy, the
scope of review to be undertaken of the judicial process that produced the
judgment in question, whether choice of law tests or reciprocity requirements
are to be imposed, and whether r~vision au fond (review on the merits) is to be
undertaken.
Despite the substantial freedom that states have enjoyed in the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments, there is a strong-though by no means
universal-tendency to give to such judgments the substantial preclusive effects
that sister-state judgments enjoy under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.26 In
particular, choice-of-law tests and reciprocity requirements are usually not
imposed, and r~vision au fond usually is not undertaken. Moreover, for
recognition and enforcement purposes, the jurisdictional requirement is usually
taken to be satisfied, provided that the judgment does not rest on a jurisdictional basis that violates the minimum due process standard imposed in the
recognition of sister-state judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State .... ").
24. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ").
25. The expression "exorbitant" to describe bases thought to be unreasonable is frequently
encountered in discussions of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. b (1971), which states:
Judgments rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full faith and
credit. In most respects, however, such judgments ... will be accorded the same degree of
recognition to which sister State judgments are entitled. This is because the public interest
requires that there be an end of litigation ....
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Foreign judgments seeking recognition and enforcement in the United States
are thus, on the whole, in a relatively favorable position; they will usually be
recognized unless infected by a serious procedural defect or based on an
exorbitant jurisdictional claim. Only a few states impose a reciprocity
requirement or a choice of law test. From the perspective of the holder of a
foreign judgment, the principal shortcoming of this scheme is that the law of
recognition and enforcement varies in significant details from state to state.27
Accordingly, until the state in which recognition and enforcement will be sought
is known, it may be difficult to determine how to enforce a foreign judgment in
the United States and what precise effects the judgment will be given.
The recognition and enforcement problem is far more difficult and
problematic when viewed from the perspective of the holder of a U.S. judgment
who wishes to enforce it abroad. In many countries, substantially less preclusive
effect is accorded U.S. judgments than would be available to a comparable
foreign judgment in the United States. U.S. judgments abroad encounter
reciprocity requirements' and are subject to the imposition of choice of law
tests and revision au fond.
A.

Advantages of a Recognition and Enforcement Convention
Treaty arrangements in the recognition and enforcement field could be
helpful to all concerned parties in three principal ways. 29 First, a convention
would ensure a rough equality between the practices of the contracting states.
Attaining such equality, in view of the relatively generous practices of U.S.
courts, would be of greater significance for the United States than for most of
its treaty partners. Nevertheless, the international order as a whole would be
served by establishing relatively uniform practices respecting the recognition and
enforcement of judgments.
Second, a recognition and enforcement convention could deal with the
regrettable practice, originated by the Brussels Convention and given further
scope through the Lugano Convention, of permitting the use of unreasonable
or exorbitant jurisdictional bases against persons not domiciled in a contracting
state, and requiring that other contracting states recognize and enforce any
resulting judgment.3" The proper solution to this lamentable situation would
be for all states in their recognition practice to take the view embodied in the
27. One commentator remarks that there is "no 'American rule' for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, but rather a crazy quilt arrangement of methods for their
domestication." Woodward, supra note 8, at 305.
28. The reciprocity requirements may be hard to satisfy, due to the difficulty of establishing
definitively recognition practice that rests largely on case law rather than statute. See supra notes 22-23
and accompanying text.
29. Additional benefits would result if the recognition convention also dealt with the assumption
of jurisdiction by the state of origin.
30. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an "exorbitant" jurisdictional
basis-service of process on a person while present in the jurisdiction-is constitutionally acceptable.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). No constitutional objection exists, however, to the
United States accepting a treaty obligation not to assert jurisdiction on this basis in litigation with
international dimensions.
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Constitution of the United States: that due process-natural justice-precludes
the use of exorbitant jurisdictional bases against all defendants regardless of
their nationality, domicile, or residence, and requires that enforcement be
refused to foreign judgments resting on exorbitant jurisdictional bases.
Accordingly, every contemporary judgment convention should include provisions
ensuring results consistent with due process in situations with which, in view of
the defendants' habitual residence, nationality, or otherwise, a contracting state
is legitimately concerned.
Third, treaty regulation would clarify and simplify recognition and
enforcement practices and procedures. As a result, a party holding a judgment
rendered in, or contemplating initiating litigation in, a contracting state could
ascertain relatively quickly and easily the effects that another contracting state
would accord if recognition or enforcement were sought in its courts.
B. The Several Approaches the United States Could Take in an Effort to
Negotiate a Judgments Convention
In concluding judgment conventions, the United States faces a particular
difficulty. Producing a reasonably comprehensive judgments regime through
bilateral negotiation would take decades. Moreover, unless each bilateral treaty
conformed to the same model, the resulting regime would lack unity.
For large states, such as the United States, bilateral arrangements are most
feasible with other states of relatively equal size and economic importance. For
example, the day may come when bilateral negotiations between the United
States and a true European federation would be feasible. Today, however,
member states of the European Union do not recognize constitutional authority
in any institution of the Union or the EC to conclude international arrangements respecting recognition practice that would be binding upon the Union as
a whole. Under the EC Treaty, as supplemented by the Acte unique europ~en
and as amended by the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union of February 7,
1992, 3' the EC Council has some limited legislative authority for the Community. This authority does not, however, extend to recognition practice.3 2 Article
220 of the EC Treaty expressly contemplates recourse to treaty arrangements
where recognition and enforcement practice within the Community is in
question.3 3 Accordingly, truly bilateral negotiations between the EC and the
United States respecting recognition and enforcement practices are virtually
impossible. Is there then any way in which negotiations could be conducted

31. 1992 O.J. (c191) 1.
32. Perhaps the expansive reading since 1977 of Article 235 of the EC Treaty-which has been
called a "necessary and proper" clause--could support the Council entering into binding negotiations,
respecting recognition within the Community of non-Community judgments. See J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2442-47 (1991). However, this method was not used
in negotiating the Lugano Convention, and, as a political matter, Community reliance on Article 235
to facilitate negotiations of a judgment convention with the United States is most unlikely.
33. See Jaques Megret et al., 15 Le Droitde la Communautg Economique Europ~enne,art. 220 cmt.
5, at 336-37 (editions de L'Universit6 de Bruxelles 1987). Accordingly, the preamble of the Brussels
Convention refers to Article 220 of this treaty.
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between the United States and a representative group of European states with
a view to achieving a recognition and enforcement convention that ultimately
would be ratified by most-if not all-of the participants?
One possibility is accession by the United States to the Lugano Convention.
Under Article 62, a state that is not a member of either the EC or the EFTA
can be "invited to accede upon a request made by one of the Contracting
States" if the EC and EFTA member states party to the Convention "unanimous[ly] agree[]." '
Assuming an invitation were forthcoming, the United
States would be interested only if, in its view, the Lugano Convention provided
an acceptable recognition and enforcement regime, since presumably no part of
the Convention would be open for renegotiation in connection with the
accession. 5
Another possibility would be to utilize the mechanisms that produced the
Lugano Convention to draft a new recognition and enforcement convention for
relations between the United States and the EC-EFTA member states.
Technically speaking, this approach seems possible. Whether such negotiations
could muster political support in the various individual nations in question is,
of course, another matter.
Alternatively, the Hague Conference on Private International Law could
be-and in 1992 was-asked to take up the topic of the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This approach, of course, enlarges
considerably the number of participants in, and the scope of, the negotiations.
Negotiation could take as its starting point the Hague Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 36 or it could-as the United States has in fact proposed-take a new
tack.37 Connecting the negotiations institutionally and substantively with the
Hague Conference solves many logistical problems, focuses discussion, and
facilitates the preparation of a broadly acceptable text.38
C.

Likelihood of Successful Negotiations

Which of the possible approaches noted above is the most attractive for the
United States? For a variety of reasons, the United States could not accede to
the Lugano Convention even if it were invited, which is itself unlikely. Most of
the exorbitant jurisdictional bases enumerated in Article 3 of the Lugano
Convention violate the due process standards established by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 39 Accordingly, the United States could not agree to enforce, as the Convention requires,

34. Lugano Convention, supra note 20, art. 62(1)(b), 1988 O.J. (L319) at 24.
35. For a discussion of whether the Lugano Convention would be acceptable to the United States,
see infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
36. See Hague Recognition Convention, supra note 17.

37.
38.
to call
39.

See discussion infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
Another, less feasible possibility would be for the United States and other interested countries
an ad hoc diplomatic conference for the negotiation of a Judgments Convention.
See Lugano Convention, supra note 20, art. 3, 1988 O.J. (L319) at 10.
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judgments rendered in another contracting state on one of these bases against
a person not domiciled in a contracting state. 40 Moreover, a treaty that entitles
a contracting state to render judgments on such bases and requires the other
contracting states to enforce such judgments would be deeply offensive to U.S.
standards of justice and fair play.
Could the United States accept Lugano if it were amended to remove the
provisions permitting exorbitant jurisdictional bases? Probably not; several
other aspects of the Lugano Convention would cause the United States serious
concern. A first sticking point is that the Lugano Convention-like the Brussels
Convention-regulates in a complete and exclusive manner the assumption of
jurisdiction as well as recognition and enforcement of judgments. While the
United States would be prepared to exclude the use by contracting states of
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, and to set out certain bases of jurisdiction that,
when used, would entitle the resulting judgments, in principle, to recognition
and enforcement, it would resist on several grounds the complete cataloguing
of the bases on which a court can exercise jurisdiction. In the first place, a state
can on occasion appropriately exercise jurisdiction in situations where another
state has legitimate grounds for refusing recognition to the resulting judgment.
Secondly, an effort to state exhaustively the bases upon which jurisdiction can
be asserted is stultifying and prevents changes in jurisdictional practice that may
be needed to take into account future legal or economic developments. Indeed,
such statements may even prove too limiting under contemporary conditions.
Thirdly, some of the jurisdictional bases recognized by the Lugano Convention
may well be either overly broad or overly restrictive, especially if the enumeration is exclusive.
In 1991, the author informally explored with representatives of the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom the possibility of using mechanisms along
the lines of those that produced the Lugano Convention to draft a convention
for relations between the United States and EC-EFFA member states. 41 It was
agreed that, given the political will on the part of the EC-EFTA member states,
negotiations taking the form of those that produced the Lugano Convention
However, since no institutional structure for such
could be successful.
negotiations exists, the parties would have to work out essentially ad hoc
negotiating arrangements. The representatives at these discussions devoted
considerable thought to the United States's initiating negotiations for a
recognition convention with the EC-EFTA. But they ultimately concluded that
placing the recognition and enforcement topic on the agenda of the Hague
Conference would result in negotiations more likely to reach results acceptable

40. Id. arts. 4(2), 28(4), 1988 O.J.(L319) at 10, 15.
41. In July 1991, the author met with Japp van Rijn van Alkemade, P.A.M. Meijknecht, and F.J.A.
van der Velden of the Dutch Ministry of Justice. In November 1991, he met with R.H.H. White and
Nicholas Hodgson of the Lord Chancellor's Department, who were joined by Peter Beaton of the
Scottish Courts Administration, Kevin Chamberlain of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Michael
Carpenter of the Legal Secretariat to the Law Offices, and Philip Bovey and Jan Clark of the
Department of Trade and Industry.
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to the United States. In Hague negotiations, the United States would not be
facing the EC-EFTA member states alone, and the entire enterprise could
benefit from the superb support that the Hague Conference provides.
Accordingly, on May 5, 1992, the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of
State, Edwin D. Williamson, wrote to Georges Droz, Secretary General of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, proposing that work be
undertaken by the Conference "with a view to preparing a ...[recognition and
enforcement of judgments] convention .... The Secretariat responded to
Williamson's letter in a generally affirmative fashion.43 The U.S. proposal was
discussed by a Special Commission in June 1992. The discussion led to the
constitution of a Working Group that met in the Hague in October 1992 and
prepared a report to assist the Seventeenth Session in deciding whether and in
what form the Hague Conference should take up the topic. In May 1993, the
Seventeenth Session decided to place the matter on this Conference's agenda
of future work."
IV
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: IS A CONVENTION SIMPLE, DOUBLE, OR
MIXTE TO BE PREFERRED?

A.

An Overview of Convention Types4 5

Recognition and enforcement conventions have traditionally been
conventions simples, which directly address only recognition and enforcement.
Their effect on the assumption of jurisdiction is indirect and limited; judgments
that do not rest on a jurisdictional basis accepted by the convention are not
entitled to recognition or enforcement under the convention. By way of
illustration, the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters' and the draft U.K.-U.S.
Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil Matters47 are both conventions simples.
Conventions doubles regulate both the assumption of jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of the resulting judgment. Such conventions set
out a "white list" detailing all the bases on which jurisdiction may be predicated.
All judgments resulting from such assumptions of jurisdiction automatically
satisfy the convention's jurisdictional requirement for recognition and

42. PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Preliminary
Doc. No. 17, 1992) (for the attention of the Special Commission of June 1992 on General Affairs and

Policy of the Conference).
43. Id. at 1.
44. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
45. The basic types of judgment recognition conventions are graphically presented in Table 1,
prepared by Peter D. Trooboff, one of the U.S. experts for the Hague negotiations, and used with his
permission.
46. See Hague Recognition Convention, supra note 17.
47. See Reciprocal Recognition Convention, supra note 10.
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enforcement. In its pure or complete form, the bases for the assumption of
jurisdiction in a convention double are exclusive; the courts of contracting states
can exercise jurisdiction in matters within the convention only if a listed basis
is present. The Brussels Convention" and the Lugano Convention are both
conventions doubles.
The U.S. proposal to the Hague Conference is for a convention mixte. Like
a convention double, a convention mixte contains a "white list" specifying
approved grounds of jurisdiction. Judgments rendered in a contracting state and
resting on an approved jurisdictional basis are entitled to recognition and
enforcement under the convention. However, unlike a true convention double,
the U.S. proposal allows contracting states to assume jurisdiction on other
jurisdictional bases not listed in the convention. Judgments resulting from the
exercise of jurisdiction on such bases are not assured of recognition under the
convention, but a state may-unless the convention expressly provides
otherwise-grant recognition and enforcement under its general law. The U.S.
mixed convention proposal also contemplates a "black list" of exorbitant
jurisdictional bases. With respect to matters covered by the convention,
contracting states would be required to forgo exercise of jurisdiction on these
bases.
B.

Discussion of the Merits of Convention Types

1. Advantages and Disadvantagesof These Three Types of Recognition and
Enforcement Conventions. Clarity, predictability, and simplicity are best served
by a convention double. By reading the convention's text, potential litigants can,
subject only to possible questions of interpretation, determine at one stroke
where they can sue or be sued, and the availability of recognition and
enforcement for any resulting judgment.
A convention mixte similarly furthers clarity, predictability, and simplicity in
two basic situations: (1) where jurisdiction could be assumed on a basis
contained in the "white list," and (2) where the only jurisdictional basis
available is a "black-listed" basis. In other situations, study of each potential
forum's general law will be necessary to determine where a suit can be brought
and whether recognition and enforcement are available under the general law
of the jurisdiction where it may be sought. A convention mixte thus produces
"white," "black," and "grey" zones. As to the first two zones, a convention
mixte has the same potential for clarity, predictability, and simplicity as does a
convention double. For "grey" zone matters, however, the situation is as
muddled as that which exists in the absence of treaty regulation.
A convention simple provides significantly less clarity, predictability, and
simplicity than either a convention double or a convention mixte. A convention
simple only regulates the recognition and enforcement of judgments resting on

48. See Brussels Convention, supra note 18.
49. See Lugano Convention, supra note 20.
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a jurisdictional basis approved by the convention. All other issues respecting
the assumption of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments fall into a "grey" zone in which the general law of individual states
controls. °

50. A convention simple could reduce the size of this "grey" zone by providing: (1) that a judgment
based on an exorbitant basis of jurisdiction cannot be recognized and enforced even if, under the
general law of the state addressed, recognition and enforcement would, absent the treaty obligation, be
available; or (2) that recognition and enforcement can be accorded only to judgments based on a
jurisdictional basis specified in the convention. The first approach is taken by the Supplementary
Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters. See Hague Recognition Convention, supra note 17. The second approach
is rarely, if ever, encountered.
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TYPES OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION CONVENTIONS
No Convention
State of Recognition

State of Origin
F-I

F-2
Uncertain Are

* F-I may assume jurisdiction on
thesebases

- F-2 may enforce judgments when
jurisdiction on these bases
* F-2 law determines

* F-I law determines

Convention Simple
F-I may assume jurisdiction on
thesebases

-

" F-I may assume jurisdiction on
these bases: F-1 law determines

-

"

List of Accepted Bases

tocert

* F-2 required to enforce judgments when
jurisdiction on these bases

-

- F-2 may enforce judgments when
jurisdiction on these bases: F-2 law
determines
(1971Hague
Convention
Protocol
provde for listof
e.cth.: b for hxi F-2troun w
Mn to e)

Area

Convention Double
* F-1 required to assume
jurisdiction only on these bases
and no others

* F-2 required to enforce judgments
when jurisdiction on these bases
(no c6ntrole)

List of Accepted Bases

" F-1 required not to assume
jurisdiction on these bases

- F-2 required to enforce judgments even
when jurisdiction on these bases
(no c6ntrole) (exception-Brussels/Lugano.
Article 28).

* Brussels/Lunano describe
certain basesin excluded area

Mixed Convention
* F-1 required to assume
jurisdiction on these bases
(subject to forum non conveniens
exception to the extent permitted
by Convention)

* F-2 require to enforce judgments
when jurisdiction on these bases
atter determination (cdnrole

List of Accepted Bases

-

.Urertaits List
" F-I may assume jurisdiction
on these bases: F-I law
determines

* F-I required not to assume
jurisdiction on these bases
(Brussels/Lugano. Article 3)

Uncertain Area

* F-2 may not enforce judgments
when jurisdiction on these bases:
F-2 law determines (cdntrole
* F-2 may enforce judgments when
jurisdiction on these bases; F-2 law
determines (cdntrole
6 F-2 determines (cntrole) whether
excluded base for jurisdiction and. if so,
required not to enforce

(Preparedby Peter D. Troobof)
June. 1994
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2. Evaluation of These Three Types of Conventions from the Perspective of
Litigants. Presumably, all potential litigants are assisted by having affordable
information available respecting jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. However, since they may select among the
potentially available forums, plaintiffs typically value such information more
than do opponents. To select wisely, plaintiffs need information on both
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement practices. Defendants have the
same needs as plaintiffs for information respecting recognition and enforcement
practices but, respecting jurisdiction, they need information only on the practices
of the court seized by their opponent. Accordingly, clarity, predictability, and
simplicity of a recognition and enforcement scheme are somewhat more
important for plaintiffs than for defendants.
Plaintiffs and defendants have clearly opposed interests with respect to the
availability of multiple forums. Where several forums are available, plaintiffs
may choose the forum that seems most advantageous in terms of litigational
convenience, expense, choice of law, and applicable procedures (for example,
the availability vel non of pretrial discovery and jury trial). Consequently,
plaintiffs generally prefer systems that increase the possibilities of forum
shopping while defendants prefer those that reduce these possibilities.
If each of the three convention types were to contain the same, relatively
restrictive jurisdictional bases, then forum shopping would be least available
under a convention double and most available under a convention simple,
because in a convention double, jurisdiction can only be assumed on bases set
out in the convention.51
The question remains whether any particular convention form is more likely
than the others to permit expansive jurisdictional bases. To the extent that a
form exhibits this tendency, its use will be more likely to create a situation
conducive to forum shopping. Since the "white list" of acceptable jurisdictional
bases in a convention double establishes a numerus clausus, negotiators will
likely strive to have included in such a convention all the bases that their
respective legal systems consider appropriate. Log-rolling may then lead to
acceptance of all jurisdictional bases that are supported by a significant number
of the delegations. Where the assumption of jurisdiction is concerned, neither
a convention simple nor a convention mixte accepts the numerus clausus
principle. Accordingly, negotiation of such conventions entails significantly less
pressure to accept an extensive list of expansive jurisdictional bases. Therefore,
various jurisdictional bases that presumably would be included in a convention
double may well be omitted in a convention simple or a convention mixte. Since

51. However, a convention double can contain provisions that facilitate forum shopping that has
no legitimate justification. This proposition is clearly illustrated by the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions. Both conventions not only make a series of exorbitant jurisdictional bases available
against defendants not domiciled within a contracting state, but any resulting judgment must be
enforced by other contracting states. See Brussels Convention, supra note 18, arts. 3, 4, 28, at 155, 161;
Lugano Convention, supra note 20, arts. 3, 4, 28, at 10, 15.
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conventions simples and conventions mixtes encourage plaintiffs to rely on bases
listed in the convention because these bases ensure recognition and enforcement, they discourage forum-shopping in reliance on bases that are only
specified by a forum's general law.
3. A Preference for the Mixed Form. The foregoing discussion, while
speculative, does suggest that a convention double may not be appropriate for
use by a relatively large and diverse community of states. Such a community
may well find that a convention mixte offers many of the advantages of a
convention double while preserving flexibility and openness and limiting the
possibilities for forum shopping.
A convention double has further shortcomings. First, the irrevocable linking
of the right to assume jurisdiction with the obligation to recognize and enforce
gives rise to difficulties in situations where one state can appropriately exercise
jurisdiction but other states have legitimate grounds for refusing recognition to
the resulting judgment. For example, when conduct in one state produces
consequences in another state, the second state has a strong claim to exercise
jurisdiction, but the first state may not want to recognize the foreign judgment.
Second, the numerus clausus prevents changes in jurisdictional practice that may
be needed to take into account future legal or economic developments. Indeed,
such statements run the risk of being too restrictive even under contemporary
conditions.
The convention mixte model avoids these difficulties by accepting a "grey"
zone. It is easier to agree upon an acceptable "white list" for a convention
mixte than for a convention double, because jurisdictional bases that a significant
number of delegations consider too permissive can be relegated to a "grey"
zone, which, as far as the assumption of jurisdiction is concerned, permits each
contracting state to adopt for its own purposes currently utilized jurisdiction
bases-and, as the need arises, to develop new bases that are neither so clearly
appropriate as to be recommended for this white list, nor so clearly inappropriate as to be black-listed. The mixed model, while avoiding difficulties that
inhere in the convention double model, also offers distinct advantages over the
convention simple model. As already discussed, a convention mixte offers both
parties significant informational advantages: a plaintiff need only consult the
"white list" to know where he can sue and where the resulting judgment will be
recognized and enforced. Likewise, a defendant can easily ascertain that certain
exorbitant jurisdictional bases are not available to the plaintiff. Additionally,
a convention mixte provides both plaintiffs and defendants with substantive
guarantees respecting the assumption of jurisdiction; a plaintiff can count on the
availability of certain jurisdictional bases,52 and a defendant is protected against
"exorbitant" jurisdictional claims.

52. If the convention recognizes the doctrine of forum non conveniens, then this statement must
be marginally qualified, since courts will be entitled in some situations to declare to exercise white-list
jurisdictional bases.

